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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JURISDICTION, CLASS ACTION, IN
JUNCTIVE RELIEF AND NONACQUIESCENCE-Lopez v. Heckler, 104

S. Ct. 221 (1984).

PREFACE

Lopez v. Heckler remains undecided, but the decisional uncer
tainty only tangentially impacts on this note, which principally concerns
the inability of large numbers of social security disability claimants to
secure judicial review of their claim that governmental nonacquiesence
[in prior circuit court holdings] denies them their constitutional rights.
The bulk of this note was written in early 1983. Subsequent deci
sions in Lopez only make minor additions to the discussion in the body
of the note. The rationale for the decisions listed in the next paragraph,
therefore, will not be discussed.
On February 22, 1984, the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals affirmed
much ofthe district court's preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court
had stayed implementation of the injunction pending adjudication.
Implementation was again held in abeyance when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review it. On September 19, 1984, Congress en
acted guidelines essentially upholding the plaintiffs' eligibility for social
security benefits. On October 16, 1984, the Supreme Court partially
affirmed and partially reversed the preliminary injunction. The govern
ment requested a rehearing and in December, 1984, the Supreme Court
vacated the injunction and directed the district court to apply the new
law. As a result, the plaintiffs have received none of the injunctive relief
initially demanded even though many had their benefits restored under
the new statutory guidelines.
The Lopezplaintiffs must begin again. Atfirst glance, all the com
batants' legal thrusts and parries appear moot. Such a characterization
is inaccurate. Nothing has been decided about the constitutionality of
nonacquiesence or the availability ofinjunctive relieffor its victims. The
statute does not prevent the government from employing nonacquiesence
in the future. The Supreme Court has avoided nonacquiesence and has
substantially narrowed the availability of injunctive relief through the
application of complex jurisdictional prerequisites, discussed in detail
below. In fact, the progress of Lopez to date casts doubt on the ability
of similarly situated future plaintiffs to gain effective review of their
277
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claims. The intricate dance performed by the plaintiffs, the government
agency, and the courts in Lopez may serve as a blueprint for subsequent
cases regardless of the final outcome of Lopez v. Heckler.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's refusal to grant an emergency
application to vacate a stay of a preliminary injunction ordered by Jus
tice Rehnquist in Lopez v. Heckler! created a legal tangle of massive
proportions. 2 Unfortunately, thousands of social security disability
payment recipients whose terminations sparked this struggle, 3 many
with scarce physical and emotional resources and some with even less
time, 4 are enmeshed in this procedural tangle with little hope of a
speedy remedy.
In Lopez, twenty named individual and fourteen organizational
plaintiffs asked for injunctive reliefS on behalf of a nationwide class
consisting of all those persons who had or might have their disability
benefits terminated on grounds that they were no longer disabled or
that their conditions had improved under Title II of the Social Secur
ity Act. 6 Plaintiffs contended that the continued use of the procedures
I. 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983). Justice Rehnquist subsequently granted this stay
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 104 S. Ct.
10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983).
2. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (issuance of preliminary in
junction requiring restitution of disability payments), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.
1983), stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983), vacation o/stay denied,
104 S. Ct. 221 (1983).
3. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434.
4. Id. at 1437.
5. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27.
6. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 401-31 (1976 & Supp. 1981). Subsections 405(g) and 405(h) state
in pertinent part:
(g) Judicial review. Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in con
troversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced
within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within
such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the
district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff
resides. . . .
(h) Finality of administrative determinations. The findings and decisions of
the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were par
ties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be
reviewed by any person, tribunal or governmental agency except as herein pro
vided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or em
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that generated termination was unconstitutional. 7 For the same rea
son, eighteen named plaintiffs also sought reversal of termination of
their Title XVI Supplemental Income Disability Benefits. 8 The district
court certified only a circuit wide class. 9 The defendant, Margaret
Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, estimated that the
class already contained 72,000 people.lO Those who might be effected
in the future would further swell the number. I I
The subsequent legal battle focused on the implementation of the
preliminary injunction that the plaintiff had sought and won. 12 The
ployee thereof shall be brought under section 24 of the Judicial Code of the
United States to recover on any claim arising under this title.
7. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27. In Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), see
infra notes 22, 25-30, 36-42 and accompanying text, and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d
1340 (9th Cir. 1981), see infra notes 23, 31-42 and accompanying text, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the Secretary was required to introduce new evidence before a
person previously declared permanently disabled could have his benefits terminated. Patti,
669 F.2d at 586-87; Finnegan, 641 F.2d at 1345. The claimants in Lopez, argued that they
were denied due process when the Secretary terminated them in the face of these rulings
without submitting new evidence. 713 F.2d at 1434.
8. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27 n.1. The court found: "Title XVI of the Social Security
Act created Supplemental Security Income Disability Benefits for persons who are both
poor and disabled. . . . SSI benefits are paid to eligible poor persons whose income and
resources fall below a specified level." Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (1976 & Supp. V
1981). The key subsections of section 1381 covering procedural requirements read in perti
nent part:
(c) Hearing to determine eligibility. . . .; judicial review:
(1) The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the
rights of any individual applying for payment under this subchapter. . . .
(3) The final determination of the Secretary after a hearing under paragraph (1)
shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the
same extent as the Secretary's final determinations under section 405 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
9. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 30.
10.

Id.

11. Id.
12. Id. The text of that portion of the court order granting class wide relief follows:
4. The plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is granted as follows:
The defendants, their agents and employees are enjoined and restrained
within the Ninth Circuit:
(a) From failing to follow, implement or accord precedential effect to Finne
gan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981) and Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d
582 (9th Cir. 1982).
(b) From implementing the nonacquiescence policy contained in Social Se
curity Rulings Nos. 82-1Oc, 82-49c and 81-6. . . .
(c) In order to accomplish appropriate restoration of disability benefits
pending resolution of this action, the court orders the defendants to implement
the following procedure:
(i) Within sixty (60) days following the date of this order, the defendants
will notify (a) each class member who had been receiving Supplemental Security
Income Disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(E), and who was termi
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Secretary objected to the requirement of the injunction that she con
tinue paying interim benefits to terminated claimants whose individual
claims were before the courts. The Secretary appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to have the enforcement of that part of
the injunction stayed while the merits of the entire injunction were
appealed. 13 The Ninth Circuit refused to stay. 14 Circuit Justice Rehn
quist, however, stayed the injunction l5 and the Supreme Court then
denied the plaintiff's request to vacate his stay.16 The case was re
manded to the appellate court so it could determine if the district
court's preliminary injunction should be affirmed.17 Because the in
junction's enforcement was stayed, the termination of all former recip
ients stood.
Lopez arose from unusual circumstances. In March of 1981 the
Social Security Administration changed and accelerated the review
procedures by which a recipient's continuing eligibility for disability
benefits was determined. IS As a result, the number of terminations bal
nated from such benefits after August 25, 1980, and (b) all other persons who
have been terminated from either Title II social security disability insurance or
Title XVI Supplemental Security Income Disability after August 30, 1981, for the
purported reason that his or her disability had ceased, whether or not such person
has appealed, that:
Such person may apply for reinstatement of benefits if he or she believes that
his or her medical condition has not improved following the granting of disability
benefits.
(ii) Upon receiving such application, the defendants forthwith reinstate and
pay benefits in the monthly amounts such person would have been receiving had
his or her benefits not been interrupted.
(iii) Following such reinstatement, if the defendants or their agents or em
ployees conduct a disability investigation or other screening of such person they
will apply the standards set forth in Patti v. Schweiker and Finnegan v. Matthews
and, if they conclude that such person's medical condition has improved and he
or she is no longer disabled, they will identify the evidence relied upon to reach
that conclusion.
(iv) Following such review, persons who are notified of an initial determina
tion that their benefits shall cease shall be given an opportunity to contest the
determination and pending such review, they shall continue to receive aid as pro
vided in current laws and regulations.
Id. at 32.
13. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434.
14. Id. at 1435.
15. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10, 16 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983).
16. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. 221, 225 (1983). This decision of the entire Court should not be
confused with the decision Circuit Justice Rehnquist made in the same case one month
earlier. See supra note 16.
17. Id.
18. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1433-34. Prior to 1982, those judged permanently disabled
could not be terminated without the presentation of new evidence that their medical condi
tion had substantially improved. The court of appeals adhered to this rule in Patti v.
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looned from 98,000 in fiscal year 1981 to over 195,000 in fiscal year
1982.19 The Lopez plaintiffs claimed the doubling of terminations was
the fruit of new procedures that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had already found illegal.2° The plaintiffs maintained that their
terminations violated the holdings of Patti v. Schweiker21 and Finne
gan v. Matthews 22 that, "before Social Security Disability Benefits
[could] be terminated on the ground that the recipient [was] no longer
disabled, the Secretary must introduce evidence that the recipient's
medical condition [had] improved. "23
In Patti an administrative law judge reversed a 1978 determina
tion that a recipient was no longer disabled. 24 In 1979, however, the
agency again terminated the plaintiff without introducing new facts.2s
A district court judge upheld the second termination. 26 The court of
appeals reversed, finding that "a prior ruling of disability can give rise
to a presumption that the disability still exists. "27 While the presump
tion did not shift the burden of proof, the Secretary "was required to
'meet or rebut' [it] with evidence that the [plaintiff's] condition had
improved in the interim."28 The court restored the plaintiff's benefits
because the Secretary presented no such evidence. 29 In Finnegan, the
plaintiff had entered the federal Supplemental Security Income pro
gram in 1974 when the California program was integrated with the
national one. 30 A grandfather clause in the federal takeover agreement
raised the presumption that former recipients under the state program
would automatically qualify for federal benefits. 31 The circuit court
reversed 32 a district court affirmance of the secretary's termination of
Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982) and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th
Cir. 1981). Once the Secretary directed her administrative law judges to ignore these rules,
see infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text, the Social Security Administration was free to
terminate recipients without amassing new evidence. This enabled the agency to accelerate
the pace of terminations.
19. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434.
20. Id. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).
23. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1434 (citing Patti, 669 F.2d at 587; Finnegan, 641 F.2d at
1345).
24. 669 F.2d at 583.
25. Id. at 584.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 586.
28. Id. at 587.
29. Id.
30. 641 F.2d at 1342-43.
31. 641 F.2d at 1342.
32. Id.
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the plaintitrs benefits,33 holding that "benefits to a grandfatheree must
not be terminated absent proof of a material improvement in his medi
cal condition."34
The court reinstated Ms. Patti's and Mr. Finnegan's benefits35 but
the Secretary refused to acquiesce in the appellate courts legal rule
created by the holdings in Patti and Finnegan that recipients were pre
sumed disabled and could not be terminated prior to the presentation
of evidence that their conditions had improved. 36 The Secretary stated
that the holding applied only to the plaintiffs before the court in Patti
and FinneganY Regardless of these decisions the Secretary would
continue to use accelerated screening procedures and new rules of evi
dence. 38 In response to Patti, the Social Security Administration ruled
that "even if current medical or other evidence does not show 'medical
improvement' . . . a non grandfathered SSI [Supplemental Security
Income] recipient is subject to cessation if such evidence shows that
the recipient is able to engage in substantial gainful activity."39 After
Finnegan, a similar ruling insured that those accepted into the federal
program who had previously been in the state program would receive
the same treatment. 40 Both rulings reflected a previously articulated
Social Security Administration policy that "[w]here the evidence ob
tained at the time of a continuing disability investigation (COl) estab
lishes that the individual is not currently disabled . . . a finding of
cessation is appropriate. It will not be necessary to determine whether
or how much the individual's condition has medically improved since
the prior favorable determination."41 Thus, the Administration did
not apply the standards mandated by Patti and Finnegan to other re
cipients during a COL This was the nonacquiescence policy that the
plaintiffs in Lopez said denied them due process under the fifth amend
ment of the United States Constitution and violated the separation of
powers mandated by Article Three of the United States Constitu
tion.42 The district court's determination in that case, that nonacquies
33. Id. at 1347.
34. Id.
35. Id.; Patti, 669 F.2d at 587.
36. Patti v. Schweiker, SSR 82-49c (Oct. 1982); Finnegan v. Matthews, SSR 82-1Oc
(Jan. 1982). In these rulings, the Secretary directed her administrative law judges not to
acquiescence in the Ninth Circuit holdings. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Patti v. Schweiker, SSR 82-49c (Oct. 1982).
40. Finnegan v. Mathews, SSR 82-1Oc (Jan. 1982).
41. Continuance or Cessation of Disability or Blindness, SSR 81-6 (Cum. ed. 1981).
42. 713 F.2d at 1434.
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cence was unlawful, provided the starting point for its grant of a
preliminary injunction ordering the Secretary to conform her disabil
ity determinations to the standards set in Patti and Finnegan. 43
The claim for classwide injunctive relief was central to the plain
tiffs effort to defeat the Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence. Since a
class action places all recipients who have been terminated in a single
suit, the injunctive relief sought would permit all class members to
continue to col1ect benefits while their eligibility claim was redeter
mined. 44 The district court had to determine, however, whether its
jurisdiction extended to the claims of the class and permitted a class
wide injunctive remedy.45
The Supreme Court's holding in Weinberger v. Salji46 is the mod
ern point of departure for an evaluation of these issues,47 which in
clude "the jurisdiction of a federal district court to entertain such
challenges [to social security administration policies, practices and eli
gibility decisions] and the related question of exhaustion of adminis
trative remedies; . . . the propriety of class actions and . . .
availability of injunctive . . . relief."48 Analysis of these issues is im
portant because Salji can be read to impede judicial review of constitu
tional issues such as nonacquiescence. What follows is a preliminary
analysis of the Salji factors.
A.

Jurisdiction

In Salji, a widow challenged on equal protection grounds a Social
Security Insurance Benefits statute that limited payments to the survi
vors of marriages that lasted more than nine months. 49 The Supreme
Court reversed a three judge district court finding that federal question
jurisdiction could be asserted because of the constitutional nature of
43. Id.
44. See supra note 12.
45. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 30-31.
46. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
47. Goldstein, The Procedural Impact of Weinberger v. Salfi Revisited, 31 DE PAUL
L. REV. 721, 723 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Salfi Revisited].
48. Id. The first two points could be modified further. The source of a court's juris
diction as well. as whether it has jurisdiction is important because various jurisdictional
statutes carry significant limitations. For instance, 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), the jurisdic
tional subsection of Title II of the Social Security Act, generally only allows a federal dis
trict court to assert jurisdiction over claims in which plaintiffs have exhausted their
administrative remedies. Social Security Act § 205(h), 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970). In a simi
lar fashion, the scope as well as the propriety of the class action is of crucial significance.
49. 422 U.S. at 755-56. The plaintiff, who had been married almost six months when
her husband died, see 422 U.S. at 753, challenged the constitutionality of the nine month
requirement. Id. at 755-56.
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the claim. 50 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that the
Social Security Act's jurisdictional section Sl barred the assumption of
federal question jurisdiction. 52 If the administrative exhaustion re
quirement of the act were satisfied, however, a federal district court
could assert jurisdiction over the claims of individually named benefi
ciaries who met all the other requirements of the act.53 Under Sa/fi,
then, if individuals contested a Social Security Administration deter
mination, they could not bring a claim to court before the agency's
mechanisms for settling such disputes had been fully utilized.
Administrative exhaustion occurs whenever the Secretary makes
a "final decision. "54 Language in the Sa/fi decision indicated that the
50. Id. at 756-61. 28 U.S.C. section 1331 gives federal district courts jurisdiction
over claims arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The court
reasoned that in this case, however, jurisdiction was controlled by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)
(1970), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (Supp. II 1976). At the time of the Sa/fi decision,
the third sentence of this section of the statute read: "No action against the United States,
the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under sections 41 of title
28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter." Social Security Act, § 205(h), 42
U.S.C. § 405(h)(1970).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1983).
52. Sa/fi, 422 U.S. at 756-57.
53. Social Security Act, § 205(h), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970 & Supp. V 1981). This
subsection reads in part: "Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made
after a hearing to which he is a party. . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days." Id.
54. Id. In order to exhaust administrative remedies a claimant who has been termi
nated normally takes the following steps:
Title 20 - Employees' Benefits Chapter III - Social Security Administration
(I) Initial determination. This is a determination we make about your entitle
ment or your continuing entitlement to benefits or about any other matter, as
discussed in § 404.902, that gives you a right to further review.
(2) Reconsideration. If you are dissatisfied with an initial determination, you
may ask us to reconsider it. Generally, you must request a reconsideration before
you may request a hearing.
(3) Hearing. If you are dissatisfied with the reconsideration determination, you
may request a hearing before an administrative law judge.
(4) Appeals Council review. If you are dissatisfied with the decision of the ad
ministrative law judge, you may request that the Appeals Council review the
decision.
(5) Federal court review. When you have completed the steps of the administra
tive review process listed in paragraphs (a)(I) through (a)(4) of this section, we
will have made our final decision. If you are dissatisfied with our final decision,
you may request judicial review by filing an action in a Federal district court.
(6) Expedited appeals process. At some time after your initial determination has
been reviewed, if you have no dispute with our findings of fact and our application
and interpretation of the controlling laws, but you believe that a part of the law is
unconstitutional, you may use the expedited appeals process. This process per
mits you to go directly to a Federal district court so that the constitutional issue
may be resolved.
(b) Nature of the administrative review process. In making a determination or
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Secretary, not the protesting claimant, determined when a final deci
sion had been made. 55 Thus, unless the Secretary waived the exhaus
tion requirement, claimants were apparently required to pursue all
administrative remedies before taking the case to district court. The
Court, however, soon delineated circumstances when the requirement
would not be literally applied. In Mathews v. Eldridge,56 the Court
subdivided the exhaustion requirement into waivable and non-waiv
able parts. 57 In deciding if it had jurisdiction over a claim, a court
could not waive the requirement that a claimant present a request for
benefits. 58 The final decision requirement could be waived if the claim
ant mounted a constitutional challenge to the procedures used by the
agency and if additional administrative decisions would not provide an
adequate remedy. 59 Thus, if the constitutionality of the process itself
were challenged a plaintiff could take a claim to federal court after
benefits had been requested but before the Secretary had rendered a
final decision. The court would still have to ascertain whether a claim
ant was placing the constitutionality of the process in question or
merely making a claim for benefits. 60
The Court's clarification of these jurisdictional guidelines in El
dridge is essential to the Lopez action because not all named plaintiffs,
let alone all the class members, had exhausted their administrative
remedies. 61 Furthermore, if the plaintiffs in Lopez were forced to ex
haust their administrative remedies, they could never challenge the
Administration's policy of nonacquiescence. The district court would
determine the eligibility for social security benefits, relying presumably
on Patti and Finnegan. Having fully exhausted the Secretary's pro
ceedings and having received a decision reversing the result of those
procedures, however, their attack on the procedures themselves would
decision in your case, we conduct the administrative review process in an infor
mal, nonadversary manner. In each step of the review process, you may present
any information you feel is helpful to your case. We will consider it and all the
information in our records. You may present the information yourself or have
someone represent you, including an attorney. If you are dissatisfied with our
decision in the review process, but do not take the next step within the stated time
period, you will lose your right to further administrative review and your right to
judicial review, unless you can show us that there was good cause for your failure
to make a timely request for review.
20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (1983).
55. Sa/fi, 422 U.S. at 763-64.
56. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
57. Id. at 328.
58. Id.
59. /d. at 330-32.
60. Id.
61. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1439.
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be moot. 62
Justice Rehnquist, however, found that the teaching of Sa/fi and
Eldridge required staying the district court's injunction in Lopez be
cause it "cover[ed] individuals who . . . never questioned the initial
determination that they [had] ceased to be disabled. "63 The Lopez
plaintiffs, however, took action equivalent to that taken by the plain
tiffs in Eldridge and in the latter case the Supreme Court found that
the action satisfied the nonwaivable claim for benefits requirement. 64
In Mathews v. Diaz6S the Supreme Court arguably created an ad
ditional ground for waiving the final decision requirement. 66 Unlike
Eldridge, Diaz challenged the constitutionality of the statute on which
the Secretary based a decision, not the procedure she employed to im
plement the law. 67 The majority in Diaz appeared to excuse exhaustion
when exhuastion was futile: If futile, "[the] element may be deemed
waived even over the Secretary's objection."68 A court would rule on
the constitutionality of a statute regardless of the Secretary's waiver of
exhuastion. If the Diaz rule were not also applied when a constitu
tional challenge to the manner in which the Secretary implemented a
constitutional statute was mounted, a plaintiff would be forced to pur
sue futile administrative actions. Thus the Secretary's nonacquiescence
guaranteed that no matter how many times a recipient attacked the
procedure, it would still be employed to deny benefits to all future
claimants until they,too, mounted a similar challenge. 69 The futility of
further administrative appeals pertaining to those procedures under
those circumstances is readily apparent. When plaintiffs exhaust their
administrative remedies and pursue the claim in federal district court,
the court will never rule on those procedures because by that time the
claim rather than the procedures themselves will be before the court.
Justice Rehnquist did not even consider Diaz when he granted the stay
62. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 452 U.S. 1308 (1983), the Court refused to rule
on the constitutionality of the Los Angeles Police Department's standard procedure of
subduing individuals with choke holds because the plaintiff no longer had standing to ob
ject to those procedures once he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 1309.
63. Heckler v. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 14. The Court in Eldridge found that "Eldridge's
constitutional challenge [was] entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement.
Moreover, there is a crucial distinction between the nature of the constitutional claim as
serted here and that raised in Sa/ji." Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330-31.
64. Salfi Revisited, supra note 48 at 738 & n.94.
65. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
66. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 76.
67: Id. at 70-71.
68. Id. at 75-77.
69. See Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1439.
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in LopezJo
B.

Class Action

Salji was a class action. 71 The Supreme Court stated that because
the complaint did not allege that all class members had filed a claim
with the Secretary, the class did not "satisfy the requirements for juris
diction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)."72 The unequivocal language cre
ated the impression class relief was impossible under 405(g).73 The
Court in Califano v. Yamasakf'4 shifted direction and allowed a class
action if all class members had satisfied the nonwaivable jurisdictional
requirement. 7s
C.

Injunctive Relief

Yamasaki also provided Social Security class action claimants
with the possibility of the injunctive relief that the Salji court appar
ently withheld. 76 In Salji, Justice Rehnquist noted that section 405(g)
"contains no suggestion that a reviewing court is empowered to enter
an injunctive decree whose operation reaches beyond the particular
applicant before the court."77 Justice Blackmun, however, speaking
for the majority in Yamasaki, found injunctive relief available unless
"the clearest command to the contrary from Congress" existed. 78 Af
ter Yamasaki, congressional silence could no longer be used to deny
injunctive relief. Language in Yamasaki particularly applies to the cir
cumstances in Lopez: "In class actions, an injunction may be necessary
to protect the interest of absent class members and to prevent repeti
tive litigatioh. "79 One purpose of the Lopez class action was to protect
70. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983).
71. 422 U.S. at 755.
72. Id. at 764. The U.S. Code section cited by the Court requires, in part, that "[a]ny
individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a
civil action." Social Security Act, § 205(h), 42 U.S.c. § 405(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
73. Salft Revisited, supra note 48, at 729.
74. 442 U.S. 682 (1979). In this case, a district court had certified a nationwide class
of recipients. Id. at 688. Those recipients claimed that the Secretary violated the due pro
cess clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2, by not holding predetermination hearings before he attempted to recoup alleged
overpayments to them. Id.
75. Id. at 701.
76. 442 U.S. at 763 n.3.
77. 442 U.S. at 705.
78. Id.
79. See Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 27.
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disabled class members unlikely to assert their own claims;80 another
was to avoid repeated litigation concerning the legality of termination
procedures that had already been decided in Patti and Finnegan. 81 Jus
tice Rehnquist also ignored Yamasaki when he stayed the implementa
tion of the injunction in Lopez.

II.
A.

THE LOPEZ INJUNCTION AND ITS AFfERMATH

The District Court Decision

The district court found that the plaintiffs easily satisfied the fac
tual requirements for granting a preliminary injunction as articulated
by the court of appeals in Beltran v. Meyers: 82 "[T]he moving party
must demonstrate 'either a combination of probable success on the
merits' and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious ques
tions are raised and the balance of hardship tips sharply in the moving
party's favor."83 The trial court in Lopez found that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on the merits because the Secretary's nonacquies
cence violated the judiciary's power "to say what the law is. . . [and
to] apply the rule to particular cases." 84 The district court disap
proved of the Secretary's stance: "[F]or the Secretary to make a gen
eral assertion that a decision of the Court of Appeals is not to be
followed because she disagrees with it is to operate outside the law."8s
The plaintiff's injury in Lopez might have been irreparable.
If such a claimant has the determination and the financial and

physical strength and lives long enough to make it through the ad
ministrative process, he can turn to the courts and ultimately expect
them to apply the law as announced in Patti and Finnegan. If ex
haustion overtakes him and he falls somewhere along the road lead
ing to such ultimate relief, the nonacquiescence and the resulting
termination stands. 86

For these reasons the balance of hardship tipped "sharply" in the
plaintiffs' favor: 87 "The record shows that some who have unexpect
edly lost benefits have already suffered deprivation. . . or even death
from the very disabilities that the Secretary deemed them not to
80. Id.
81. Id. at 29.
82. 677 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1982).
83. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 29 (quoting Beltran v. Meyers, 677 F. 2d 1317, 1320 (9th
Cir. 1982».
84. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803».
85. Id. at 30.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 29.
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have."88 No judge disputed this finding of the district court although
some failed to reach the question. Further, the judge found that the
failure of the Secretary to follow established judicial precedent
presented a serious legal question of denial of due process. 89 Thus, the
plaintiffs had satisfied the Beltran alternatives.
The court found that the case met the Federal Rules of Civil Pro
cedure class action guidelines. 90 It limited the class to the circuit, how
ever, based on its belief that the courts of other circuits would be
better equipped to determine the legality of the Secretary's nonacqui
escence within their circuits. 91 The court did not address possible pre
clusion by Salfi of classwide relief and did not confront the barriers
that Salfi may have raised to injunctive remedies.
The district court treated jurisdiction cursorily: "[T]he [Salfi]
Court noted that formal exhaustion was not required . . . once the
Secretary 'has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutional
ity of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdic
tion to determine.' "92 The judge, however, neglected the distinction
between the procedural constitutional claim made against the manner
in which the Secretary implemented a constitutional statute in Lopez
and the substantive constitutional attack on the law made in Salfi and
Diaz. He further noted that the court of appeals in Ringer v.
Schweiker 93 applied the Salfi exception when the Secretary's ruling
"makes the result of that process 'both preordained and immuta
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 30-31. The court stated:
This court now finds that this group fulfills the requirements for class certifi
cation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). . . . The common constitu
tional challenge to the policy of nonacquiescence is a legal claim shared by all
class members. The class representatives' claims are typical of those of the class
since they stem from the same course of conduct, again the nonacquiescence, and
pose the same constitutional challenge thereto. The representatives are adequate
because they have no interests antagonistic to the class members and seek the
identical relief sought for the class. Moreover, counsel for these representatives
are able and experienced in protecting the interests of the poor.
The proposed Ninth Circuit class also fulfills the requirement of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 29 (quoting Salfi v. Weinberger, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975».
93. 697 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2013 (1984). This reversal, a
possibility noted by Justice Rehnquist when he first granted the temporary stay, Lopez, 104
S.Ct. at 14 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983), destroys this argument, see infra note 169.
The distinction between Ringer and Eldridge, however, remains critical. See infra note 110
and accompanying text.
91.
92.
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ble.' "94 The district court failed to recognize, however, that the circuit
court's analysis in Ringer flowed from the Court's consideration in El
dridge of the constitutionality of a procedure, not from the examina
tion of the constitutionality of the statute in Sa/fi. The trial court
concluded that any further recourse to administrative procedures at
tacking nonacquiescence would prove futile 95 because the Secretary
had admitted that the administrative law judges had been directed to
ignore the Patti and Finnegan guidelines.

B.

The Court of Appeals Denial of the Secretary's Application for a
Stay

The district court focused primarily on nonacquiescence. The
Supreme Court, however, had not directly confronted nonacquies
cence in the twentieth century.96 While a number of appellate courts
had soundly condemned nonacquiescence,97 the Supreme Court's si
lence might have bespoken a reluctance to decide the issue. Perhaps
sensing this possibility the court of appeals affirmed the implementa
tion of the injunction but focused on the murky jurisdiction, class ac
tion, and remedy guidelines provided by Sa/fi, Eldridge, Diaz, and
Yamasaki that the district court had ignored in assessing the plaintiffs'
likelihood of success. Because the Secretary merely asked for a stay of
the part of the injunction which required her to pay interim benefits,
the only issue before the court was whether those benefits would be
paid to former recipients terminated under guidelines that had been
ruled illega1. 98 Judge Reinhardt, speaking for a unanimous three judge
panel, refused to stay that part of the injunction. 99 The appeals court
applied the same standard the district court had used in granting the
preliminary injunction to determine if a stay should be granted. 100 The
court also stated that under the circumstances it could reverse a lower
court order only if it were clearly erroneous or if the judge had abused
94. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 29 (quoting Ringer v. Schweicker, 697 F.2d at 1295 (9th
Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2013 (1984».
95. Id.
96. Outside of tax cases, this author has not encountered a single Supreme Court
reference to the doctrine of nonacquiescence.
97. See. e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marhsall, 636 F.2d 32, 33 (3d Cir.
1980); ITT World Communications v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980); Ithaca College
v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1980), eert denied. 449 U.S. 975 (1980).
98. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435.
99. Id. at 1440.
100. Id. at 1435. The court applied "two interrelated legal tests." On the one hand,
movants must establish "a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irrepa
rable injury" while, on the other hand, they raise "serious legal questions" and demonstrate
"that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." Id.
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his discretion. 101 The appellate court retraced each step of the balanc
ing process articulated by the district court.102 It paid greater attention
to the burden the government bore in paying interim benefits but con
cluded that the balance still overwhelmingly favored the plaintiffs. 103
The court determined that the defendant's nonacquiescence pos
ture had little likelihood of success. 104 Nonacquiescence was unconsti
tutional: even if it were not, any agency decision not grounded upon
the Patti and Finnegan guidelines would be "rejected summarily
whenever challenged in this circuit."105 The court saw "little chance
that the Secretary will convince this Court to the contrary."106 With
regard to the issue, therefore, the plaintiff had demonstrated a likeli
hood of success and had raised serious legal questions. 107
In her request for a stay, the Secretary contended that the district
court did not have jurisdiction over the claims of all certified class
members. lOS Her attack could not be disposed of easily. The Secretary
claimed that neither the nonwaivable presentation of a claim require
ment nor the waivable exhaustion of administrative remedies require
ment had been satisfied by all class members. 109 The appellate court
101. Id. at 1436 (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. National Foot
ball League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980).
102. Id. at 1432-36.
103. Id. at 1436-38. In discussing the government's burden the court found that "the
physical and emotional suffering shown by plaintiffs in the record before us is far more
compelling than the possibility of some administrative inconvenience or monetary loss to
the government."Id. at 1437. The kind of harm caused by the terminations, including pos
sible death, would be irreparable and not susceptible to retroactive relief. Id. The court
found that the public interest also commanded the injunction: "The government must be
concerned not just with the public fisc but with the public weal. . . . Our society as a
whole suffers when we neglect the poor, the hungry, the disabled or when we deprive them
of their rights and privileges." Id.
104. Id. at 1438.
105. Id. at 1438 & n.8. The court may not be saying that all nonacquiescence is
unconstitutional but rather that this nonacquiscence is. Unfortunately, the court provides
no clue as to why some nonacquiescence actions might be acceptable.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1438. The court appears to be applying the same standard that the dis
trict court did. This apparently contradicts its earlier statement that it would apply the
same standard as the district court did and only overrule the district court judge if he had
abused his discretion in making his decision. Id. at 1436.
108. Id. at 1438. The court discussed the possibility that mandamus jurisdiction
might also be available to the plaintiffs: "We have recently held that section 1361 [manda
mus) offers 'an independly adequate ground for jurisdiction' in a case dealing with a 'consti
tutional challenge' to the illegal termination of social security disability insurance benefits."
Id. at 1438 n.9 (quoting Leschniok v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1983». The
future of this alternative jurisdictional vehicle before the Supreme Court is uncertain and is
beyond the scope of this note.
109. Id. at 1439.
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found that the nonwaivable requirement had been satisfied because: (1)
recipients had been receiving benefits when they were terminated; and
(2) the Secretary had had an opportunity to reinstate them. 11O The
court found support for its analysis in a decision from another cir
cuit. 111 The court's reliance on another circuit is curious in light of the
more direct support provided by Eldridge v. Mathews. 112 In Eldridge,
the claimants fulfilled the prerequisite by taking action similar to that
of the Lopez plaintiffs. 1I3 Lopez and Eldridge were, thus, analogous
challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative procedure. 114
Despite the failure of the court of appeals to rely on it, Eldridge
plainly authorized its conclusion in Lopez that the nonwaivable ele
ment of jurisdiction had been satisfied.
The court found several grounds on which to premise its finding
that the waivable requirements had also been met. 1I5 First, the refine
ment of Salfi by Eldridge supported the district court's conclusions:
"It would have been futile to require plaintiffs to pursue administrative
remedies in the face of the Secretary's announced policy of nonacqui
escence."116 The court excused exhaustion of administrative remedies
under the circumstances. 1I7 Second, the plaintiffs made a constitu
tional attack on the Secretary's nonacquiescence. liS The Secretary had
made up her mind and was unlikely to consider substantial changes
"at the behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional chal
lenge in an adjudicatory context."119 The court, therefore, excused ex
haustion of administrative remedies. 120 Finally, even if the claim had
been statutory rather than constitutional the court excused exhaustion
because the Secretary had taken a final position with regard to proce
dures for redetermining eligibility.121
The Secretary argued that many class members had not met the
110.

Id.
Id. (citing Ellison v. Califano, 546 F.2d 1162, 1164 (5th Cir. 1977». In Ellison
a benefits claimant asserted the unconstitutionality of an administrative rule that caused a
couple who had separated to be treated as married for six months after the separation. The
appellate court found that under these circumstances exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not required. Ellison, 546 F.2d at 1164.
112. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
113. Id. at 329. See infra note 181 for explanation of the procedure.
114. See supra notes 19-24, 58-64 and accompanying text.
115. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1439.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1440.
119. Id. at 1439 (quoting Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330).
120. Id. at 1439-40.
121. Id.
Ill.
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statutory requirement of appealing the agency's termination finding
within sixty days.122 Ordinarily, failure to make a timely appeal
would render the initial judgment res judicata as to future proceed
ings. Judge Reinhardt cited language in Salfi and Eldridge that the
court would deem a res judicata claim waived if not reopened by the
agency.123 Even though the barren record in Lopez suggested a
waiver, Judge Reinhardt rejected the Secretary's reliance on adminis
trative res judicata. 124 He based his rejection on a Supreme Court dic
tum to the effect that "the administrative res judicata bar is ordinarily
not applied when an agency's decision is challenged on constitutional
grounds."125 A close reading of Califano v. Sanders,126 the quoted de
cision, however, reveals that the court referred to the agency decision
to waive the statute of limitations not the decision to terminate the
plaintiff. 127 No claim was made in Lopez that the Secretary unconsti
tutionally applied administrative res judicata. An administrative bar of
an untimely claim would normally not be reversible even if, as in Lo
pez, the underlying claim for benefits was based on the Constitution. 128
The circuit court's application of Sanders to the Lopez claim, there
fore, was inappropriate.
The appellate court then took pains to distinguish a recent court
of appeals holding. In Smith v. Schweiker129 the Second Circuit re
versed a district court's finding that it had jurisdiction in a termination
class action case. 130 The plaintiffs in Smith, as well as those in Lopez,
argued that procedures such as those mandated by Patti and Finnegan
had not been followed. l3l The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lo
pez distinguished Smith because no constitutional question had been
raised and none of the named plaintiffs had exhausted their adminis
trative remedies.132 The Lopez court found, therefore, that, while the
Secretary "may have raised 'serious legal questions', she ha[d] failed to
make a showing of probability of success on the merits."133
122. Id. at 1440.
123. Id. The Court in Eldridge stated: "These two requirements specify a statute of
limitations and appropriate venue, and are waivable by the parties." 424 U.S. at 328 n.9.
124. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440.
125. [d. (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977».
126. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
127. Id. at 109.
128. [d. at 108.
129. 709 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1983).
130. Id. at 781.
131. Id. at 779.
132. 713 F.2d at 1440.
133. Id. Judge Pregerson stated in a concurrence:
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Justice Rehnquist Grants a Stay in His Capacity as Circuit
Justice for the Ninth Circuit

Within days, Circuit Justice Rehnquist temporarily stayed the
implementation of part of the injunction so the court could consider
the appeal. 134 He found that the Secretary's request required staying
"the portion. . . which requires her to pay benefits to all applicants
until she establishes their lack of disability through hearings comply
ing with Patti and Finnegan."135 He found three guidelines by which
to make the decision: (1) whether four justices would vote to grant
certiorari; (2) whether the "stay equities" would tip in the plaintiffs or
defendant's favor; and (3) what the final outcome of the claim would
likely be. 136 He noted that petitioners ordinarily ask for a stay only so
they can be given time to ask the Court for certiorari .137 Justice Rehn
quist found, however, that the unusual circumstances that gave rise to
the Lopez petition enabled him to stay a district court injunction so
that an appeal could be made to a circuit court. 138
Circuit Justice Rehnquist first attacked the scope of the districts
court's order. 139 He acknowledged that four Justices would be unlikely
to grant certiorari on the propriety of the Patti and Finnegan guide
lines and that no conflict over these criteria existed among the cir
cuits. l40 The propriety of the guideline, an issue of statutory
interpretation, was not the issue. The issue was whether the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rule of law once declared must be applied in
subsequent cases. The plaintiffs presented a claim which the district
and circuit courts denominated constitutional. Justice Rehnquist, on
the other hand, expressed himself troubled by the injunction's
"mandatory nature, its treatment of. . . exhaustion of administrative
I concur completely in Judge Reinhardt's opinion. I write separately only to
emphasize my concern over the Secretary's avowed policy of nonacquiescence
with Ninth Circuit law as enunciated in Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.
1982), and Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). The Secretary's
ill-advised policy of refusing to obey the decisional law of this circuit is akin to the
repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification whereby rebellious states re
fused to . . . recognize certain federal laws within their boundaries. . . . The
government expects its citizens to abide by the law - no less is expected of those
charged with the duty to faithfully administer the law.
Id. at 1441.
134. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983).
135. Id. at 12.
136. Id.

137.

Id.
Id. a~ 13-16.
139. Id. at 13-14.
140. Id. at 12.
138.
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remedies. . and its direction to the Secretary to pay benefits on an
interim basis to parties who have neither been found by the Secretary
nor by a court of competent jurisdiction to be disabled."141 He found
that such an injunction "significantly interferes with the distribution
between administrative and judicial responsibility for enforcement of
the Social Security ACt."142 He argued that the seriousness of the
legal questions meant that he did not have to consider the stay
equities. 143
Circuit Justice Rehnquist used two guidelines in his analysis: first,
the teaching of Salji required the exhaustion of administrative reme
dies; and, secondly, FPC v. Transcontinental Pipeline Corp. 144 required
that the scope of judicial review of such administrative determinations
be narrow. 145 Notwithstanding his concession that the propriety of the
administrative guidelines was not the issue, he appears to be saying
that courts should not interfere with the administrative process. He
found that a court would need strong grounds for "determining that
additional evidence is requisite for adequate review . . . [and that it
could not] proceed by dictating to the agency the methods, procedures
and the time dimension of the needed inquiry."146 The reasoning
would especially hold true when the only action any class member has
to take to force the government to pay would be to assert "his subjec
tive belief [that] his medical condition has not improved since the ear
lier determination."147 The analysis makes sense if the issue is the
propriety of the termination guidelines. If the issue is nonacquies
cence, however, the analysis is irrelevant. Justice Rehnquist's analysis
bore on whether the termination guidelines were proper not on
whether a circuit court's finding that they were not should have been
followed.
Justice Rehnquist next scrutinized the issue of exhaustion of ad
ministrative remedies. He found that some class members had not met
the nonwaivable requirement of presenting a claim for benefits and
that other class members had failed to meet the waivable requirement
of exhausting their administrative remedies. 148 He held that, under
Salji, only the Secretary could determine if further pursuit of adminis
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
(1976».
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
423 u.s. 326 (1976).
Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10, 12 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983).
Id. (quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333,
Id. at 14.
Id.
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trative remedies would be futile l49 and in doing so, he ignored the sub
sequent softening of the language in Eldridge. 150 He admitted that the
appellate court's decision in Ringer excused exhaustion if the Secre
tary had taken a "final position,"151 but he pointed out that certiorari
had been granted in Ringer to review that holding. 152 Because of these
conclusions, only the constitutional nature of the claim remained to
justify the waiver of the waivable requirement.
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Eldridge excused exhaus
tion when a constitutional claim was made, but stated that the Lopez
claim did not necessarily meet this requirement merely by being la
beled "constitutional."153 He found that the Secretary's failure to pro
vide predetermination hearings in Eldridge raised a constitutional
question while the claim in Lopez only concerned an insufficient evi
dentiary showing and was, therefore, not constitutional in nature. 154
He could draw this distinction only because he ignored the nonacqui
escence claim of the plaintiffs.
Justice Rehnquist found the mandatory nature of the circuit
court's injunction objectionable. 155 Arguably, that class members
either still were or previously had been receiving benefits showed that
they sought a prohibitory (which would maintain the status quo),
rather than mandatory (which would command new action) injunc
tion. He found that because of the injunction'S mandating nature, the
court's power to grant relief did not extend to plaintiffs. 156 He noted
that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Heckler v. Day l57 to re
view a lower court order that the Solicitor General pay interim bene
fits to all class claimants while the Secretary made an initial
determination of their eligibility. 158 Justice Rehnquist argued that Lo
pez presented an analogous situation l59 but neglected to mention that
the claimants in Day, unlike those in Lopez had not previously been
collecting benefits.l60
Justice Rehnquist accepted the lower court's finding that the eq
149. Id.
ISO. 424 U.S. at 328.
lSI. 697 F.2d at 1295, rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984).
152. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 14-15.
153. Id. at 14.
154. Id. at IS.
ISS. Id. at 12.
156. Id. at IS.
157. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1873 (1983).
158. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 21.
159. Id. at IS.
160. Id. But see Day, 685 F.2d at 21.
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uities favored the plaintiffs. 161 He stated that the manner in which the
district court sought to remedy the situation caused him to stay the
injunction. 162 In other words, relief for individuals who had been ter
minated would be appropriate if they had presented a claim and ex
hausted their administrative remedies 163 but class wide injunction
relief would be too intrusive an action for a district court to take un
less all class members met strict jurisdictional requirements. l64 These
considerations apparently overwhelmed the merits of the nonacquies
cence claim. They left, however, hundreds of thousands of eligible in
dividuals, whose nonacquiescence claim would never be reviewed,
without benefits.
D.

The Supreme Court Affirms the Stay

Despite this glaring problem, five Justices denied, without com
ment, the plaintiffs' application to vacate Justice Rehnquist's stay.165
Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Blackmun in his partial dis
sent. 166 Justice Stevens noted that some class members had received a
final determination and had sought judicial review within sixty
days.167 The stay, he urged, should not have applied to them. 168 He
maintained that these members had satisfied both the waivable and the
nonwaivable prerequisites because, after termination, they each had
returned a questionnaire in which they had claimed continued disabil
ity.169 This action, in addition to the fact that "their benefits had been
161.
162.
163.

Lopez 104 S. Ct. at 15.

Id.
Id.
164. Id.
165. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. 221, 222 (1983). Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor,
White and Powell joined in Justce Rehnquist's majority opinion.
166. Id. at 221-25, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id.; see Appellees-Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Emergency Appli
cation to Vacate Stay at \0 n.11, Lopez v. Heckler, 104 S.Ct. \0 (Rechquist, Circuit Justice
1983). The steps a claimant takes are as follows:
The procedure starts with the recipient's completion of a questionnaire
which asks, among other things, whether the recipient or the treating physician
believes the recipient can work. . . . Following the state agency's review process,
a tentative determination letter is sent with an invitation to submit additional
evidence if available prior to the final determination. The notice terminating disa
bility benefits, if any, follows final review of the case, including any additional
evidence. . . . The only recent change is the requirement of a face-to-face inter
view with the recipient at the local Social Security district office at which time the
Social Security worker assists the recipient complete a questionnaire.
Id.
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terminated on the basis of a regulation that [was] assumed for the pur
poses of this proceeding to be invalid,"170 satisfied the non-waivable
requirement. l7l Plaintiffs had met the waivable precondition because
the Secretary had taken a final position and, therefore, further admin
istrative appeals would have been futile. 172 Under these circumstances,
Justice Stevens reasoned, the Court in Diaz had found that "this ele
ment may be deemed waived even over the Secretary's objections."173
Justice Stevens felt it made no difference whether the claim were con
stitutional or not.
Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented. 174 They stated that
the equities so strongly favored the plaintiffs that regardless of ques
tionable legal issues the stay should have been vacated.17S Justice
Brennan noted that if the full Court were considering the injunction
rather than the stay, he might have agreed with most of Justice Ste
vens's analysis, but he did not believe it was presently necessary "to
provide further support for the conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals," 176 particularly because the appellate court's opinion
"clearly explained why the beneficiaries. . . satisfied the jurisdictional
requirements of 42 U.S.c. §§ 405(g) and . . . (h)."177 Brennan was
the only Justice to mention nonacquiescence: "[I]t is the Secretary
who has not paid due respect to a coordinate branch of government
[by] expressly refusing to implement the binding decision of the Ninth
Circuit." 178

III.

ANALYSIS

The issues presented in Lopez have produced multifaceted and
often contradictory judicial responses. 179 All judges who have consid
ered the nonacquiescence claim, however, appear to agree that it has
merit. 180 Justice Rehnquist's decision to review the injunction in
dependent of the merits of the nonacquiescence claim l81 is one critical
170. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 224 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Diaz, 426 U.S. at 75-77).
174. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 225 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 226-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440. But see 104 S.Ct. at 221.
180. Lopez, 713 F.2d. at 1436; Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 14 (Circuit Justice Rehnquist ac
cepted for the purposes of this motion that the claim had merit). Lopez, 104 S.Ct at 223,
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. 104 S.Ct. at 12.
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element that sets Justice Rehnquist and the four Justices l82 who, in
Lopez, supported his stay apart from the remaining Justices and judges
who have issued rulings in this case. The refusal to consider the merits
of the nonacquiescence claim is neither legally nor logically sound.
Schmidt v. Lessard l83 provides the sole source of authority for not bal
ancing the equities among the litigants. Under a balancing theory the
choice lies between the excess cost the government would incur when
individuals who should not be collecting benefits receive them and the
harm termination might visit on those who are cut off unjustly because
of the government's nonacquiescence. 184 In Schmidt, a court granted
injunctive relief to a class of individuals over eighteen years old invol
untarily committed to mental institutions in Wisconsin. 18s The injunc
tion did not specify the form of relief mandated. 186 The defendant
could not determine how to comply; therefore, the injunction violated
the specificity requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 187
The Lopez injunction is specific. 188 The problem presented by Schmidt,
therefore, is not applicable in these circumstances. Perhaps Justice
Rehnquist meant that Schmidt stands for the broader proposition that
injunctions could generally be scrutinized without reaching the merits
of the claim. This theory draws no support from the short Schmidt
opinion which focused only on the importance of specificity in an in
junction. 189 The opinion gives no hint of any broader pretentions.
Moreover, when the mandate of an injunction is arguably unclear, one
questions the sufficiency of the clarity of its contents not why it was
issued. 190 If the mandate is clear, however, then the scrutiny should
focus on the legal merits of that mandate.
Justice Rehnquist also considered it significant that the injunction
required the Secretary to initiate monetary payments. 191 His distinc
See supra note 177.
183. 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
184. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1436.
185. 414 U.S. at 473-74.
186. Id. at 476.
187. Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. Rule 65 in relevant part provides: "Every order granting
an injunction. . . shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in tenns; shall
describe in reasonable detail; and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the
act or acts sought to be restrained." Id.
188. See supra note 12.
189. 414 U.S. at 473-77.
190. Id. at 477. The precise language of the Court is; "[W]e can hardly begin to
assess the correctness of the judgment entered by the district court here without knowing
its precise bounds." Id.
191. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 13.
182.
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tion between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions 192 implies that he
might accept an order that required the Secretary to keep paying
rather than to start paying benefits. He cited Heckler v. Day 193 for the
proposition that the Court frowns on an injunction that requires the
payment of interim benefits in similar circumstances. 194 The plaintiffs
in Lopez, however, had been receiving benefits prior to their term ina
tions 195 while the plaintiffs in Day had never received benefits. 196 The
circumstances of the two cases are, therefore, significantly different.
Thus, the distinction between a prohibitory and a mandatory injunc
tion breaks down.
For the purposes of the motion to stay, Justice Rehnquist ac
cepted that all members of the class had once been judged disabled by
a government agency and subsequently illegally terminated without
the production of new evidence. 197 He faulted the district court's in
junction, however, because it allowed only the recipients' "subjective
belief' to entitle them to injunctive remedy.198 Justice Rehnquist ap
parently considered only the period after termination and, thus, ig
nored the totality of the circumstances. Most fundamentally, he
disregarded the fact that the Secretary's basis for termination was an
evidenciary standard previously held illegal by the court of appeals.
Justices Stevens and Brennan and the lower court judges share
the virtue of permitting the plaintiffs nonacquiescence claim to be ad
dressed. 199 Despite their difference all appear to have been affected by
the equitable strength of the plaintiffs position. Perhaps this accounts
for their willingness to inquire into the merits of the nonacquiescence
claim. But in order to reach the merits these judges had to dispose of
the Salfi problems raised by Justice Rehnquist. Recall that Justice
Rehnquist's analysis grappled primarily with three questions: (1)
whether the plaintiffs presented claims for benefits (2) whether the na
ture of their claims was such that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies could be excused and (3) whether the sixty day statute of
192. Id. A mandatory injunction is one that orders the start of some activity. A
prohibitory injunction is one that commands the maintainance of the status quo. Id.
193. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cm. granted, 103 S.Ct. 1873, vacated, 104 S. Ct.
2249 (1984).
194. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 15.
195. 713 F.2d at 1434.
196. 685 F.2d. at 21.
197. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 15.
198. Id. at 14.
199. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting), Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 227 (Bren
nan, J., dissenting).
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limitation requirement applied to members of the class. 20<Yfhe remain
der of this note will sketch a different approach to these questions, one
that is sensitive to the separation of powers concerns of Salfi without
allowing these concerns to frustrate judicial review of the important
issue of agency non-acquiescence.
A.

Claim for Benefits: The Nonwaivable Element

Ellison v. Califano 201 arguably provides support for the appellate
court's finding that the nonwaivable claim for benefits requirement
had been met. 202 In Ellison, the court said: "In the context of this case,
a claim for benefits was presented to the Secretary automatically when
the SSI recipient reported a separation from an eligible spouse."203
The Supreme Court has never approved an "automatic" claim the
ory.204 Because Ellison represented a challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute and Lopez a challenge to the constitutionality of a proce
dure, the latter arguably does not arise in the context to which the
Ellison court limited its holding. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
could have found stronger support for its position from Eldridge. Both
Eldridge and Lopez challenged the constitutionality of the Secretary's
procedures. 2os The Eldridge Court found that the plaintiff's response
to a questionnaire sent out to recipients by the Secretary satisfied the
nonwaivable request for benefits requirement. 206 The plaintiffs in Lo
pez filled out an almost equivalent questionnaire. 207 Thus, Eldridge
rather than Ellison provided the appellate court with stronger grounds
for finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the nonwaivable request for
benefits prerequisite.
Justice Stevens, in partial dissent to Lopez, relied on Eldridge, not
Ellison. 20s Justice Powell, the author of the Eldridge opinion, sup
ported Justice Rehnquist's stay.209 This may reflect a change of posi
tion on Justice Powell's part or he may have merely been deferring to
200. 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), stay granted, 104 S.Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice),
stay affirmed, 104 S.Ct. 221 (1983). Justice Rehnquist does not reach the statute of limita
tion issue in granting the stay, 104 S.Ct. at 10-15. Justice Stevens does not explicitly say a
class action is appropriate but it is implied in his decision. See id. at 221-25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
201. 546 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1977).
202. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
203. 546 F.2d at 1164 (emphasis in the original).
204. Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 14 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983).
205. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
206. 424 U.S. at 332.
207. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
208. 104 S.Ct. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 221.

302

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:277

the Circuit Justice's opinion in granting the Lopez stay. In either case,
the theory of Lopez is that a recipient has to do more than fill out a
questionnaire stating that he/she is still entitled to benefits.
This result is not only inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pre
vious holding in Eldridge, it is wholly impractical. The district court
noted that many Lopez litigants would have trouble protecting their
rights because of their disabilities. 210 It is reasonable to assume that
many would do no more than fill out the questionnaire. Apparently,
under the majority view, they would be unsuccessful if they later
fought the termination of their benefits. Nonacquiescence, therefore,
coupled with the Supreme Court's ruling in Lopez, might severely
limit the number of eligible individuals who eventually would have
their benefits reinstated. If the use of nonacquiescence effectively
reduces the total number of recipients, a desire to cut costs could re
sult in its repeated use.
The manner in which benefit termination occurs may also lower
the percentage of recipients who meet the request for benefits con
straint. If the department informs individuals that new evidence com
pels the cessation of their benefits, they are likely to contest evidence
they think is false. The same individuals, told that a procedural change
in the way evidence is considered will result in a benefit termination,
may fail to act. A procedural change is external to the claimant. The
individual may feel powerless to act because the change has nothing to
do with the person's condition. When procedural changes bring about
termination, therefore, demanding more than a response to the ques
tionnaire will further limit the scope of the certified class. Deserving
individuals may lose their benefits.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: the Waivable Element
The class would be further constricted if the standard required
exhaustion of administrative remedies as to all class members. The
majority who supported Justice Rehnquist's stay may not still agree 211
with the language of Salfi212 that the Secretary had the sole discretion
to determine when further appeals would be futile. 213 This interpreta
tion may possibly revitalize this power of the Secretary. As noted in
the introduction to this note, the Court appeared to retreat from the
210. Lopez, 572 F.Supp. at 31.
211. See Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 221.
212. 422 U.S. at 749 (1975).
213. Id. at 766.
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conclusion in Eldridge: 214 "A claimant's interest to have a particular
issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judg
ment is inappropriate."2Is The judiciary need not defer if further ad
ministrative action could not possibly settle the claim. The Lopez
plaintiffs' challenge to the Secretary's nonacquiescence could not pos
sibly have been settled through further administrative appeals because
the Secretary had directed her administrative law judges not to acqui
esce in the Pattj216 and Finnegan217 holdings. The language of El
dridge rather than the language of Salfi should govern the Lopez
claim.
Justice Stevens might have been seeking a middle ground. 2ls He
approved an award of interim benefits, but on a statutory rather than a
constitutional basis. 219 In other words, if the Secretary's procedural
instructions render further appeals futile, then even if the Secretary's
action raises no constitutional issue, she has taken a final position.
Once the Secretary has taken a final position, the Supreme Court's
Diaz 220 decision excuses further administrative appeals. 221 Professor
Goldstein has argued that the court held that "[a]s to the waivable
element, the Court held that a final decision had been made within the
meaning of Section 405(g) despite the secretary's protestation to the
contrary since he had conceded the absence of factual issues and that
the applications had or would be denied because of the challenged
statutory provisions. "222
Unlike Lopez, however, Diaz concerned a constitutional challenge
to a statute not to the implementation of new regulations for carrying
out an unchallenged statute. 223 Professor Goldstein acknowledges,
however, that "it can be argued that the final decision requirement
should be approached differently when legal issues arise out of the reg
ulations. . . [M]uch more deference should be accorded the Secretary
when the legality of regulations is at issue."224 The distinction between
an attack on the Secretary's procedures and a substantive constitu
tional challenge to a statute argues against the application of the Diaz
214.
215..
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

424 u.s. 319 (1976).
Id. at 330.
669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).
104 S.Ct. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 223.
426 U.S. 67 (1976).
Id. at 70.
Sa/fi Revisited, supra note 48, at 729-30.
See supra notes 69-75.
Sa/fi Revisited, supra note 48, at 730.
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holding to Lopez. Again, the holding of Eldridge excusing further fu
tile administrative action appears more appropriate, because Eldridge
and Lopez are both attacks on the constitutionality of procedures
adopted by the Secretary.
Perhaps Justice Stevens relied on Diaz rather than Eldridge to
support his dissent to the Lopez stay. If he could convince Justice
Powell that his stance corresponds more consistently with one of Pow
ell's earlier decisions,225 Justice Stevens might garner the fifth vote he
needs to support his position. Because Justice Powell was the author of
the Eldridge decision,226 however, he may be more likely to apply El
dridge rather than Diaz to an analogous situation.
Even if the basis for the Lopez claim were merely statutory, the
Court should still reach the merits of the Secretary's policy of nonac
quiescence. If the court decides in the claimant's favor, it would read
the Social Security Act to require the Secretary to follow its interpre
tation of particular provisions of that act. Both Eldridge and Justice
Stevens' interpretation of Diaz, thus, authorize the Court to address
the legality of the policy of the Secretary that gave rise to the nonac
quiescence claim, whether as a statutory claim or a constitutional
matter. By utilizing statutory rather than constitutional analysis, Jus
tice Stevens hurdles Salfi and addresses nonacquiescence.
In Lopez, the district 227 and appellate228 courts concluded that
plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim. 229 According to Justice Ste
vens, they might have succeded with merely a statutory challenge: ap
perently, however, they presented a constitutional claim. They did not
necessarily say, "We are entitled to benefits," but rather, "We are enti
tled to have our benefits reviewed according to rules of law mandated
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals." The plaintiffs charged that
the Secretary unconstitutionally refused to acquiesce in this rule of law
and that she therefore denied them due process and violated separa
tion of powers by terminating their benefits.230 The district court de
termined only that the Lopez claimants were entitled to benefits until
their cases could be screened under the Patti and Finnegan criteria: if
the agency "conclude[s] that such person's medical condition has im
225. Justice Powell is the author of the Eldridge decision. The actions of the plain
tiffs in Lopez are virtually equivalent to the actions of the plaintiffs in Eldridge. See supra
note 185 and accompanying text.
226. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319.
227. 572 F. Supp. at 29-30.
228. 713 F.2d at 1432 (1983).
229. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 224 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 28.
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proved and he or she is no longer disabled, [it] will identify the evi
dence relied upon to reach the conclusion."231 Even if sufficient
evidence were presented, therefore, class members might still be termi
nated. Perhaps the Supreme Court remains reluctant to screen evi
dence presented at administrative hearings. A difference exists,
however, between scrutinizing the rules of evidence and reviewing the
evidence itself. If the Secretary can employ illegal evidentiary rules,
she accrues broad powers to immunize her activities from judicial re
view. Such rules can be applied to many statutes. The Lopez stay sug
gests that the Supreme Court is willing to examine only the outcome
produced by such rules in particular individual cases, thus effectively
leaving the rules of evidence themselves free from judicial scrutiny.
The Court serves neither the spirit nor the substance of the Constitu
tion by this approach.
C.

Statute of Limitations

If a claimant does not appeal the Secretary's final decision in sixty
days to the district court, the ruling is res judicata in all subsequent
claims. 232 Yet the class the district court certified included individuals
who had not made a timely appea1. 233 ·The court of appeals concluded
that the Supreme Court in Salfi234 and Eldridge 235 had determined
that the statute of limitations was "waivable by the parties and not
having been timely raised below . . . need not be considered here."236
The court of appeals cited a second ground to deem the requirement
waived: "In any event the administrative res judicata bar is ordinarily
not applied when the agency's decision is challenged on constitutional
grounds."237 Justice Rehnquist did not discuss this issue in his stay
order, but Justice Stevens correctly rejected the argument. 238 A court
may review constitutional challenge to the agency's decision to apply
the sixty day statute of limitations. 239 A court may not review the ap
plication of the statute of limitations, however, just because the under
lying claim against the Secretary is constitutional in nature.
In Califano v. Sanders, the Court implied that a constitutional
231. Id. at 32.
232. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440.
233. Lopez, 572 F. Supp. at 31-32. See also Lopez, 104 S.Ct. at 222 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
234. 422 U.S. at 763-64.
235. 424 U.S. at 328 n.9.
236. Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1440.
237. Id.
238. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. at 224 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977).
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challenge to the application of the sixty day statute of limitations
would be justiciable. 240 The plaintiffs might make a stronger claim if
they were to maintain that claimants were not likely to know that they
could appeal a change in administrative procedure. 241 Claimants
might assert that the Secretary had given them insufficient notice
under the circumstances. While the fate of the argument before the
Supreme Court is uncertain, it would more closely meet the review
ability requirements of Sanders.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The heart of the problem for the Lopez litigants is the Court's
refusal to acknowledge the constitutional issue of nonacquiescence.
The Court's reluctance may reflect the complex political setting in
which the doctrine is employed. 242 The Supreme Court may also fear
that courts would unnecessarily encumber agencies by dictating proce
dures. The Court's hesitancy is understandable, but as a result hun
dreds of thousands of Lopez v. Heckler claimants, none found
ineligible under the applicable Social Security Act standards set out in
Patti and Finnegan, remain without the support many of them need to
survive. Furthermore, the Court's refusal to reach the issue encour
ages nonacquiescence, thus making an ultimate confrontation more
likely.
Whether there can be judicial review of the Secretary's policy of
240. Id.
241. This, in effect, is making a constitutional argument of improper notice.
242. Outside the tax arena the doctrine of nonacquiescence was articulated by the
National Labor Relations Board as early as 1953. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB,
204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953). The court rejected its validity, id. at 533, but the case was not
appealed. The position of the NLRB was that only the Supreme Court could alter its rul
ings. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found the NLRB's repeated resort to this
tactic illegal: "[O]ur judgments. . . are binding on all inferior courts and litigants in the
. . . district, and also on administrative agencies. . . . For the board to predicate an order
on its disagreements with this court's interpretation of a statue is for it to operate outside
the law." Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs
in the above two cases were companies appealing what they considered to be pro-union
decisions. In Lopez, the agency arguably is using nonacquiescence as a sword to terminate
the rights of those it is charged with protecting. In the NLRB setting, the agency used the
doctrine to shield the rights of those in its charge. A determination of the constitutionality
of nonacquiescence would have farreaching effects because it might affect the functioning of
many administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, Internal Revenue
Service, Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection
Agency to name a few.
A full discussion of the history of nonacquiesence in an NLRB setting is contained in
Mattson, The United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB: 'Stare Decisis' Only Applies If
The Agency Wins, 53 OKLA. BAR. J. 2561 (1982).
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nonacquiescence is the fundamental issue presented by Lopez. If Patti
and Finnegan had been followed, none of the Lopez plaintiffs would
have lost benefits as a result of the application of illegal standards.
The first circuit-wide determination that the agency had employed
such standards would redound to the benefit of all claimants. When
nonacquiescence is added, however, the result of the first claimant's
case would have no effect on other claimants. The difference argues
for broad class-wide relief, but instead the Court has applied jurisdic
tional barriers that limit class membership.243 The result "represent[s]
a classic elevation of form over substance."244
Robert Meeropol

243. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983).
244. Appellees-Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Emergency Application to
Vacate Stay at 11, Lopez v. Heckler, 104 S. Ct. 10 (1983).

